La déréglementation de la finance dans les années 80 était supposée, dans une optique Schumpétérienne, être favorable à l'innovation. Mais la mondialisation de cette industrie de la finance a surtout accru son caractère court termiste tandis que les schémas d'innovation devenaient plus « ouverts », c'est-à-dire moins centrés sur une firme ou un entrepreneur et impliquant une multiplicité d'acteurs et d'entreprises. Cela conduisit dans les années 2000, après l'éclatement de la bulle spéculative sur le prix des actions des entreprises hi-tec, à une certaine aversion du capital financier pour l'innovation, préférant concentrer ses investissements spéculatifs sur l'immobilier. La crise financière de 2008 peut mettre un terme à cette dérive, il n'est pas sûr que cette finance libéralisée devienne pour autant plus favorable à l'innovation.
Introduction
Ever since the aftermath of the second world war two conceptions have been fighting over the role of the state in a modern economy. On one side were those believing that the states should intervene in order to target and achieve full employment. The world economic crisis of the 30s, leading to world war II , gave full legitimacy to their credo. They were a mix of radicals (following Beveridge) thinking that full employment was to be achieved at all geographical level by all means , including public enterprises and of standard Keynesians who had a broader interpretation of the objectives of the state, limited to the usual tools of fiscal and budget policies. On the other side we found people , like Hayek and his followers, much opposed to state intervention in the economy, believing that market mechanisms could take into account all the complex dynamics of demand and supply. The "modern capitalism" that came out of these debates was definitively in favour of state intervention. The Keynesians, whether radical or standard, won the case. The Hayekians retreated to clubs and foundations like the Mont Pelerin in Europe and the American Institute in the US, attracting distinguished academics as Milton Friedman. As time passed and memories of the dramatic experiences of the past faded away, their anti interventionist theses were listened to more, all the more so that the world was divided in a capitalist camp and a socialist camp, which turned out to be much less successful in terms of growth and welfare. When the thirty "golden years of capitalism" came to an end with the crisis of the early seventies (end of the gold exchange standard, important confrontation between capital and labour ) the anti interventionist theses of the Hayekian received special attention. The publication of Milton and Rose Friedman 's book "Free to choose" in 1977 is emblematic of this change of direction. This counter reform especially developed in countries like the US and the UK where the "golden years" were those of slow growth in comparison with countries of continental Europe or of Asia (more precisely Japan) which remained relatively more interventionist, each in their own way. This counter reform led effectively to some changes in the regulations of the forms of competition in various sectors. The deeper internationalisation of the economies in itself was often calling for adjustments. The financial sector was prone to claim for such deregulation. The pre and post war regulations of these activities had wanted to keep as low as possible the risks of speculative bubbles and other financial vagaries in segmenting activities, setting controls and ceilings etc.. If the financial sector was not the only one to push for liberalisation, it was certainly the quickest to call for it and the one where it led to a drastic change in the forms of competition and in turn to the emergence of global finance. In contrast with most sectors this deregulation was not accompanied by some standardization of the new financial products, a prerequisite to have a freer and more transparent market. There was little protest that such neglect was paving the way for global financial instability. Warnings, such as Minsky (1986) , found little echo at the time Whalen (1993) . Not only has the financial sector been pro active in this counter reform but it also could claim that its liberalisation was consistent with a general change in the forms of competition more driven by innovation in most product markets. In other words the claim was that a liberalised finance could help to set free all the potential for innovation. This is precisely the issue that this paper wants to investigate. The first section will directly look at finance as a key promoter of deregulation. Section II will then see to what extent the association between finance and innovation is or not linked with an archetype popularised by Schumpeter, whereby entrepreneur's capacity to innovate is highly conditioned by his ability to access finance. Section III will come back on whatever happened on this ground of finance and innovation in the transition period of the years 2000. Changes in the overall patterns of innovation lead to question the effectiveness of finance. Has it been boosting innovation or on the contrary has it been hampering the dynamics of innovation? Section IV will then try to follow the main traits of the herding speculative behaviours in the financial sector that led to the various international financial crises of the last decade, just to position the successive drives that led to these repeated crises and the lessons drawn by the financial sector. Section V in conclusion will question the chances for a reframed financial sector to help to face the major innovation challenges that changes in our global environment are raising.
I Finance as main promoter of deregulation
The financial sector has been a major and early promoter of the wave of deregulation that took off in the early 1980s, under the "reigns" of Thatcher and Reagan. Many reasons were given at the time to support in all countries plans to liberalize financial activities. In the first place came the difficulties met by cross borders transactions at a time of increasing internationalisation of developed economies. Increases in international trade flows had led to large increases in cross borders financial transactions. The end of the Bretton woods agreements on a fixed exchange rate system had led to the development of large currency markets and therefore of large international transactions. In an highly regulated financial system banks and other financial institutions were much tempted to develop off shore activities. They presented deregulation as an ultimate possibility to avoid delocalisation. A second argument in favour of the deregulation of the financial sector was that the structures of production had changed. The large firms mainly based in a country and therefore attached to one nationality were loosing ground in favour of truly multinational firms , producing in different places all over the world. Such international deployment of the productive structures required foreign outwards investments, all of which increased the pressure in favour of liberalisation of the financial industry. Clearly leaving to finance more leeway was going to contribute directly to a process of creative destruction whereby a more proactive , flexible finance would facilitate a fruitful reallocation of productive capital. There was also a third reason backing the campaign for deregulation. Namely after three decades of a post war expansion, largely fuelled by process of catching up in continental Europe, there was a general feeling that developed economies were entering a new phase where competitiveness was going to be much less based on price competitiveness and more on qualitative factors (such as design, innovative technological characteristics, after sales service). A deregulated finance did seem in this perspective as a natural co-evolution, matching on many grounds the transformation of the structures of production. In a decade or so major steps of liberalisation were taken in the financial sectors in most of the OECD countries. By the early 2000s the financial sectors were fully opened to entries from abroad.
By contrast with what was experienced in other product markets the deregulation of the constraints set on the modes of production was not accompanied by sets of rules -(norms and standards on products) applying to standardization of financial products. It was a fully fledged liberalisation that occurred much in advance on other domains and without the constraints that kept developing on the very products (see Basu, 2003, 2004) . By contrast the ratio of countries having at least one state-controlled company remains relatively high (70% for financial institutions and 50% for insurance) , recalling that the sector was largely under public tutelage in the previous period (much like transport, communication and health). This overall view on levels of product market regulations by sector should not mask that countries differ on this issue. If one grades the levels of liberalization on a scale from 6 (highly regulated) down to 0 (totally deregulated) , figure 2 shows that a bunch of Anglo Saxon countries turn out as relatively liberal while an eclectic set of Mediterranean and eastern countries appear as relatively still more regulated than others by 2003 2 . Overall one can see in figure 2 that the average indicators of product market regulation, PMR, have still been significantly declining between 1998 and 2003, while reforms have been passed for most of them in the 1980s. The question is now to check that this liberalised finance has been more strongly conducive of innovation that in the past. 
II Is Schumpeter to be blamed ?
Schumpeter 's "Theory of economic development" (1934) is a key pioneer reference on the subject of finance and innovation. Schumpeter first praised the role of entrepreneurs in the process of development. In his view the competitive process of capitalist economies was bound to lead to efficient use of existing resources. Still the major factor of economic growth obviously relied on innovations in both processes and products. But innovation in turn required investment that entrepreneurs , or more precisely the individual entrepreneurs praised by Schumpeter, could not straightforwardly afford. Access to finance was thus central in his view to the dynamics of innovation that entrepreneurs could launch. Thus was established in the first place the link between finance and innovation. Systems of finance that duly opened credit to entrepreneurs were definitely factors of economic growth. The question of course was then to know which projects were to be supported , which were not. Schumpeter first held a restrictive and rather tautological view on this link between finance and innovation. Finance was to support innovations that required both sizeable new investments and were operated by new entrepreneurs setting up new firms 3 But experience led Schumpeter to change his view and to adopt a broader and more realistic conception of innovation. The major fact in that respect was the development in the interwar period of a new organisation of large firms. The period was effectively marked by the diffusion of the M-form firm (multi-divisonal) that is of a new mode of organisation of firms by means of divisions specialised by product and overviewed by R&D department. This multi-division structure facilitated the emergence of new products as well as major updating or delocalisation of production processes. This evolution occurred first in the US just before World War II , then in Europe after World War II (see figure 3 ). It led to the development of R&D divisions in large firms especially in charge of designing and planning innovations, be they process innovations or products innovations. This diffusion was completed during the "golden years" of capitalism, e.g. the three decades of the post war period (see figure 3 ). Schumpeter adjusted his views on finance and innovation to this new reality, as can be seen in Capitalism, socialism and democracy (1943) . The role of finance became in this post war period somehow more complex. Large firms had various possibilities from self financing to borrowing or issuing stocks. The oligopolistic structure of the competitive process allowed large firms to mark up their current costs of production in order to be able to finance most of their R&D. Existing firms remained the main actors in R&D activities, and new incumbent firms were only a small minority . Considering this change in the views of Schumpeter on finance and innovation, it became . The project in itself was directly stemming from the entrepreneurs 'own ideas.
common to distinguish a Schumpeter mark I from a Schumpeter mark II, which partly simply reflected an historical change in organisational pattern of innovation management by industrialised economies.
Figure 3
Source: Kogut (2000) Looking at the fabric of industries also led to distinguish between sectors. The importance of R&D divisions differed leading to categorize between hi tech industries where R&D spending represented more than 5% of the overall value of production, medium hi tech where it ranges between 3% and 5% and low tech industries where it gets down to less than 3% of production. Even so Schumpeter mark II remained a largely outdated view to characterize the link between finance and innovation in the aftermath of the mid 1970s and the crisis of the "golden age of capitalism" . A relative endogeneization of the financing of innovation has been a major trait of the "modern capitalism"à la Schonfield that prevailed during the three post war decades. Financing innovation was either part of the normal growth process of large firms, cared for by the mark up applied to current production costs or an issue that required some arrangements with public authorities, either for regulatory reasons or because the projects had large externalities. Some of these concerns appeared in intermediation industries (in transportation, communication but also in distribution and in banking where regulations were effectively binding). This state of affairs has changed in the 1970s with the crisis of the "fordist" model , the liberalisation of the economies in the 1980s and their growing internationalisation. It all brought back to the forefront the issue of finance and innovation that had become relatively neglected (as noticed by O'Sullisan (2006) . Meanwhile the perspective on finance and innovation given by Schumpeter mark II had become irrelevant. No Schumpeter mark III was available to update it. Two streams of thoughts concurred to fill this void. On one side studies on innovation developed, outlining new patterns of innovations more interactive, combining various actors, taking into account various learning processes. These studies were concerned by innovations schemes developed by large and small firms as well. In a way they could be seen as developing some Schumpeter mark III, featuring elements of a new historical configuration of the links between finance and innovation. The other stream of thoughts, that also praised the concern of Schumpeter for the dynamics of finance and innovation, took a more general and ideological view. It stated that, in a competitive process that is increasingly based on non price competition, innovation plays a key role that liberalisation of all product markets can efficiently boost. The Schumpeterian dynamics of finance and innovation is there strongly used in support of liberalisation policies. Somehow in this last perspective the issue of finance and innovation gets back to Schumpeter mark I with an idealised entrepreneur. Much of the discourse on venture capital in the 1990s has been emblematic of such vision. It combined idealised views of finance, taking directly risks on very innovative projects , and of innovation , where blueprints came directly out of the heads of smart, young graduates just exiting from universities. The diffusion of the technological system centred around information and communication technologies (ICTs) played a specific role in this feature, with the emblematic figures of young successful entrepreneurs such as Bill Gates and rapidly growing firms that had started from zero (the so called "gazelles"), such as Microsoft . Still the configuration of the links between finance and innovation that developed in the 1990s had little to do with Schumpeter mark I and brought no support to liberalisation policies.
III Whatever happened to the links between finance and innovation in the 1990s
What we have hinted at so far is how organisational structures and characteristics of technological systems at a given historical period condition the configuration of the links between finance and innovation. Perez (2002) gave a long term view of such determination. The age of information and telecommunications, starting around the 1970s, represents the fifth technological revolution since the industrial revolution of the late eighteen century and it is associated, according to Perez (2002, p18) , with a techno economic paradigm gathering most of the organisational traits mentioned above. Still the association of the diffusion of ICTs with an increased internationalisation of large firms and a development of a globalised financial system does allow to conclude on the nature of a) the new link established between finance and innovation and b) the society that will come out of such protei-form techno economic paradigm . Liberalisation of finance and internationalisation of the economies may well have somehow crowded out financing of innovation. There are good grounds to think that such has been the case. The new financial and liberalised capitalism that emerged in the 1990s has indeed led to new rules of governance at odd with the kind of long term investment that financing of innovation requires. Share holder value has become the main criteria of governance of firms listed on stock markets (see Aglietta and Reberioux , 2005) . At the same time the number of stock markets has increased significantly so that most of the large firms around the world have been submitted to similar rule of governance. Short term results that increase the value of the stocks and/or the dividends became a must. Mergers and acquisitions helped to meet such short term targets when product markets were not enough buoyant. Clearly in this perspective innovations of importance which required rather long term investment were not welcome. One could conversely defend the opposite and see in the increased internationalisation and liberalisation of the economies as a factor enhancing innovations at least in the developed economies. The thing is that a competitive process always more driven by innovation in a world economy, where emerging countries and low wage costs countries are taking most of the product markets driven by prices, should effectively give a new impetus to innovation. Internationalisation also contributes in helping to pool many sources of research and development. Moreover the creation of new stock markets specialised in hi tech stocks (of which the NASDAQ stock market in New York has been a major example) has clearly facilitated strategies of innovation by new firms. It was thus a real issue in the 1990s to see whether the short term logic of share holder value would overtake or not the dynamics of innovation spurred in developed economies by the competition on internationalised product markets.
Part of the answer laid in the configuration taken by the innovation systems in the present phase of internationalisation. The old configuration, where R&D departments of large firms played a crucial role in the dynamics of innovation, both in terms of product and process innovations, was bound to be transformed by the possibility to pool knowledge resources at a worldwide level. This potential was all the more important that liberalisation policies had facilitated market relations with university research laboratories. A good example of this liberalization had been given by The Bay Dole Act (1980) in the US, whereby research in public laboratories, which had been financed by public money, could now patent and diffuse their results.
This was an important change which helped to diffuse a more mercantile view of research activities. Altogether at the same time waves of mergers and acquisitions, to meet the goals of the new circumstances), contributed to change deeply the fabric of the innovation systems. Externalisation in a broad sense, by means of selling and buying patents, subcontracting of all kinds of tasks, setting up joint venture, cooperation...all concurred to transform the old linear model of R&D. It was accompanied by specific institutional settings (such as fiscal advantages, new markets, etc.) completing the liberalisation of product market and production (see table 1 ) This transformation of the world of research and innovation led to patterns of innovation that have been qualified in the mid 1990s of "open innovation" by contrast with the rather linear and close model , where knowledge and inventions produced in public laboratories where turned by in house R&D departments of large national firms into projects of product and process innovations to be implemented by in house departments of production (see Christensen et alii, 2005) . By contrast in contemporary patterns of open innovation one could observe a diversity of external sources of knowledge and inventions, turned into innovations by R&D departments as well as by specialised business services , that could then either be used by firms or outsold to other firms. The chain going from invention to innovation could thus in this environment more internationalised and liberalised, follow a large diversity of paths. The flows of exchanges in these various paths from inventions to innovations did not remain as unidirectional, from inventors to users, as it seems in the above description of innovation patterns. The division of paths went altogether with more interactive processes where lessons and demands of users could be channelled back along the chain at any stage and influence supply. Such increased interactivity in patterns of innovation has been outlined from the mid 1980s (see Kline and Rosenberg, 1986 for instance). In the more recent phase of the 1990s the characterization of "open innovation pattern" just stresses a further step in the segmentation or modularization of the process of invention-innovation. Firms opted for specific strategies more or less dependent on the specificities of their sector 4 The whole system of innovation patterns was not though totally transformed in the process. Large firms were still key actors by the end of the 1990s in conducting innovation (see Phelps (2006) ).
. Indeed new paths in innovation financing developed. The most emblematic was venture capital which appeared like a financial instrument, especially dedicated to support new innovative projects at a very early stage where financial support is crucial. Even if the first venture capital operation appeared in the US in the 1950s (see Gompers and Lerner, 2002) it gained a new momentum in the 1980s and 1990s, following first the authorization given to research laboratory benefiting from public money to patent their inventions (see Bay Dole Act 1980 above) and second the creation of second stock markets at the turn of the 1990s more dedicated to high stocks. Still it channeled only a minor part of the investment linked to innovation (see figures in Phelps 2006)..and early phase investment is also a minor part of VC funds which tend to concentrate more on deals of more mature hi tec firms. A qualitative assessment of the change in R&D practices indicates that looking for radical innovation appeared undesirable, in the context of short termism of the financialised liberalized capitalism, and led firms to look for "radical" incremental innovation, that is innovation that may not be intrinsically radical but are so attuned with what the market expects in terms of design and uses that it wins the competition and comes to dominate the market (see Le Masson et alii ,2006..) . This specific shift towards more market driven innovation is in accordance with all the claims that the conditions of diffusion have become a key issue (Bidhe 2006) . This multidimensional transformation of the space of innovation strategies of the firms is moreover bound to be idiosyncratic, that is to say to depend on some national characteristics of the educational systems, of the public research systems as well as of the financial systems and of the labour markets of the economies under view. It thus strongly grounds systemic perspectives such as developed around the notion of national systems of innovation (see Nelson 1993) . The question is now to see whether all these changes (even if potential) have fuelled or hampered the dynamics of innovation. One can make a preliminary assessment of this dynamics by looking at the performances in terms of productivity gains. As the technological revolution occurring at the time is centred around ICTs we have selected data that distinguished sectors producing and using ICTs and we have given the share of ICT in equipment. Tables 2 and 3 help to compare Europe 15 with the US, where production and diffusion of ICT goods are more advanced. The period under view is 1995-2004 which corresponds to R&D strategies developed in the nineties considering it takes on average 4-5 years for them to impact. Tables 2 and 3 also show rather low productivity gains in all sectors, be they manufacturing or services, using ICTs or not, with the only noticeable exception of the industrial sector producing ICT goods. But this ICT sector represents only a small share of the productive activities (some 3,4% of hours worked in Europe and some 7% in the US) This average result is mediocre and does not plead for a renewed dynamics of innovation spurred by new R&D strategies in developed economies.
A second look at the tables shows that comparatively the sector of distribution and the sector of finance have been faring better in the US than in Europe. This extra growth in productivity in the US in distribution and financial services cannot be explained by standard R&D activities that do not exist in these activities. Their results stem from other innovation strategies. The dominant role of the US financial sector, at an international level, certainly helped. Conversely one can link the relative performance in distribution services in the US with a modernization, largely based and steered by the firm Wall Mart 5 Before drawing conclusions on the impact of financial liberalization on the dynamics of innovations, let us notice that the two services under view, namely distribution and financial services, are also those where measurement of productivity is the more problematic (see Griliches, 1994) .
.
IV The lost decade of a financialised capitalism 1997-2008
One is tempted to conclude from the above that the financial liberalization and globalization had no sizeable impact on the dynamics of innovations as measured in terms of productivity gains. But one should not forget in this overview that the period of the 1990s and the turn of the 2000s has not been a period of quietness for globalized finance. It has been marked by large financial crises which certainly impacted the strategies of innovation of the large international firms. First was the Asian crisis which showed the global instability of the system. Some lack of confidence of traders in New York on the trustworthiness of the Thai currency, for fear of overinvestment in housing, initiated some US capital flights and launched a world wide crisis, affecting deeply East Asian countries in the first place, then Latin America and Russia. At the same time the collapse of a major hedge fund LCTM 6
All this happened in the mist of speculative runs in stock markets on dot.com firms, eg firms dealing one way or another with ICTs, and most of the time linked with the development and use of internet. Stocks of firms that had never made any profit were thus rapidly priced higher than stocks of old mature industries. This speculative bubble burst in 2000 leading stocks prices real down, especially on second markets.
showed that even at the core of globalised finance dangerous hazards could hang around.
This crash showed that many so called financial innovations had led to or simply consisted in fraudulous actions. A lot of financial transactions, kept off the books, created very uncertain situations for a lot of the successful dot.com firms of the recent past. The most emblematic case has been Enron, often praised 7
The lack of transparency that it implied could and did lead to all kinds of frauds and provoked a wave of mistrust that affected all stock markets. Still the lessons of 2001 seemed to have been soon forgotten with little changes in the (de)regulation. Those which were made, such as the diffusion of new accounting norms, valuing firms assets at current stock market values and not at investment prices, increased the instability of the system. New controls on banking such as Basel II, implemented in the aftermath of the 2001, did not take much notice either of the problem of vested interests of private controllers. Still trust somehow resumed if one considers the steady rise of the stock markets prices from 2002 till 2007. Though the whole system became even more short term oriented and thus even less inclined to take long term risks on innovative projects. It showed in the fact that second markets recovered much less rapidly while venture capital nearly became an endangered species to quote Phelps.
in the previous decade for its innovations in financing. In the aftermath of 2001 it became also clear that rating agencies had vested interests, being paid by the very enterprises they were rating. So did auditing services.
Indeed the fraction of support to early stage financing which was small became negligible. Robb(2006) stresses that venture capital in real early stages projects represented only 0,02% of GDP in the US in the mid 2000s. It rises up to 0,2% of GDP if one includes all the deals done by venture capital which concern much less risky and more mature innovative projects. Furthermore these VC deals are for respectively 42% and 41% in ICT and life sciences industries, sectors which represent around 20% of GDP. VC had always been investing in projects that had already showed their viability : in the mid 1990s 77% of the deals concerned three years old projects. Table 4 shows to what extent VC risk taking towards innovative projects decreased after the 2001 stock market prices crisis.
This occurred on top of a strong reduction in the overall volume of deals in VC after 2001, clearly showing that financial capitalism was by no mean speculating on innovation. This novelty aversion (Bidhe, 2006a) explains why financial capitalism tended after 2001 to concentrate on housing ventures. It looked beneficial for both national construction industries (to some extremes in countries like the US and especially in Spain which looked as a model of economic growth in Europe at the time) and for financial industries which by means of intensive securitization created instruments to fuel the whole process while maintaining short term horizons of investment. The disastrous effects of such orientation were clear from the start. Lending on housing was extended with little care for environment and urban planning. Spain gave the worst example of such damages. Financial industries deployed their techniques of securitization, segmenting deals to extremes, especially in the US, allowing still born commitments where defaults were obviously matter of days. The so called sub prime crisis that emerged in 2007 was truly no surprise. One has only to see the rise in "no documents loan" , where you don't even ask any guarantee to borrowers, in the US (from the usual 5% up to 20% in the early 2007) or the initial excessive levels of endebtment of those who finally defaulted in 2007 and 2008. 1997-2007 was indeed a lost decade as the drawbacks of global finance capitalism were clearly exposed Basu, 2003,2004) . First the East Asian crisis of 1997 confirmed the structural instability of the system, as explained by Minsky(1995) . International lending to East Asian countries which had shown such extraordinary successful growth from the mid 1980s onwards was a first speculative run of the freshly globalised finance (see Mayer 1999, Arestis and Glickman 2002) . The economic crisis which followed a reversal of this speculation seriously harmed the economies of the East Asia region. Second this warning did not slow down the speculative run on ICTs ventures which had started in the early 1990s in most OECD countries leading to a sharp fall in stock market crisis in 2001. Little lessons were drawn from these examples of Minskian financial instability, although the dominance of finance seemed unsustainable, not only to critical economists like Susan Strange (1998) or Jan Toporowski (2000) among others, but also to business men like Soros (1998 Soros ( , 2000 . The speculative run that developed in the 2000s through the securitization of housing loans gave a dramatic illustration of this un-reconstruction. A supersized financial sector has turned all its innovation ability inwards in order to force to unprecedented heights the levy of financial intermediation. The share of finance in US total corporate profit for instance rose from 10% in 1980 to 40% in 2007, while the sector represented at the same time 5% of employment and 15% of value added. Conversely the share of the stocks of financial firms rose from 6% of total to some 20% in 2007 while its debts rose from 10% of GDP to some 60% of GDP Two major financial crises , namely 1997 and 2001, touching different important aspects of globalised finance, did not lead to any deep reform of the system (see Arestis and Sawyer (2005) ). Will the system do any better after the 2008 crisis? The massive intervention of the States to avoid a full systemic crisis seems to imply that a big reform should follow. But the bankruptcies of some major financial establishments have left many survivors of the finance industry in monopolistic positions, with sizeable perspectives of profit on a still globalised market, all of which shortens memory. Partisans of returning to a primitive finance (see Bidhe 2009) are getting less numerous… unless the worsening of the current economic depression pushes it back strongly on the agenda.
V Reregulating finance: a prerequisite to face the contemporary challenges.
But the challenge, that may impose some transformation of the financial system, does not stem only from the need to counter the current economic depression.
There is a strong consciousness across the board of most nations of a serious threat of environmental disaster. It is also clear that some non renewable natural resources, oil in the first place, could be exhausted in a relatively near future.
The world seems at a cross road where a globalised finance can accordingly be the solution or the problem to meet these global challenges.
If the relationship between productive capital and financial capital does follow the four phases pattern suggested by Perez(2002) we should be at a turning point, following what we would effectively qualified of a frenzy phase (see table 5 ), waiting for a new phase of synergy between financial capital and productive capital, centered around the diffusion of a new technological revolution. Finance would facilitate the emergence of such a new technological revolution and productive capital would be at the helm to shape and manage this wave. It remains difficult to see how such synergy can occur. If the wave of innovations is supposed to help to meet the environmental challenge the globalised nature of finance is on par with the global nature of the threat. But the deregulated nature of the industry remains at odd with the highly collective nature of the objectives. In that sense an adequate reregulation of finance seems a prerequisite to have any efficient recoupling of finance and productive capital. Source: adapted from figure 7.1 in Perez (2002) 
